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This paper characterizes the evolution of Paraguay’s policymaking process (PMP) 
between 1954 and 2003. We present an overview of the PMP under the rule of 
Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89) and explore the institutional setting emerging after 
1989. We discuss how the Colorado Party progressively broke up into several 
factions and characterize the distinctive patterns of policymaking that emerged 
after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution. We hypothesize that the presence of a 
large number of veto players has made policy change more difficult and that 
legislators are inclined to pursue particularistic policies. In order to test those 
hypotheses, we rely on a database containing virtually every bill introduced in 
Congress since April 1992. Our conclusions suggest that the current Paraguayan 
PMP may be flexible for the provision of particularistic benefits but is rigid for 
the approval of broad regulatory or redistributive policies. 
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1. Introduction 
The average growth rate of the Paraguayan economy between 1996 and 2000 has been -1.9 
percent, while per capita GDP fell 6.1 percent in 2002 compared to its 1995 level. Despite the 
country’s deteriorating macroeconomic conditions, no major reforms have been implemented in 
recent years. Following the 1995-1997 financial crisis, fiscal deficits have steadily increased 
from 0.3 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4.3 percent of GDP five years later. Economic reforms 
intended to stabilize the economy also came to a standstill in the legislative stage. For example, 
in November 2002 the Minister of Finance resigned in protest over congressional delays in 
authorizing a stand-by agreement with the IMF. The fact that most reform attempts were stalled 
rather than implemented, and were then overturned  or implemented very inefficiently, reveals 
that the country’s levels of policy adaptability are very low. 
Why has it been so difficult to modify public policies in Paraguay? Is this rigidity a 
problem for all policy areas or only for some contested policy dimensions? This article 
characterizes the Paraguayan policymaking process (PMP) between 1954 and 2003. It identifies 
four distinctive periods in the evolution of the Paraguayan PMP: the “golden age” of the 
Stroessner dictatorship (1954-1981), the late Stronismo period (1982-1989), the transitional 
Rodríguez regime (1989-1993), and the current period marked by democratic institutions (1993-
present). 
Section 2 presents a stylized model of the PMP under the rule of Alfredo Stroessner 
(1954-89). Section 3 provides an overview of the 1989-93 transitional regime, discussing how 
the dictatorship’s policymaking rules, which initially remained in place, allowed for an initial 
period of rapid policy change. In the following years, however, these rules changed in order to 
allow for the democratization process and the emergence of new players. The Colorado Party, a 
“granitic” organization under the dictatorship, progressively broke up into an “archipelago” of 
factions (Arditi, 1993). Section 4  characterizes the distinctive patterns of the policymaking 
process that emerged after the adoption of the 1992 Constitution, identifies the new institutions 
and players, and develops some hypotheses about the ways in which these factors are expected to 
shape the underlying rules of the new PMP (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003). In order to test those 
hypotheses, we rely on a database containing virtually every bill introduced in Congress since 
April 1992. Rather than focusing on substantive policy areas, we focus on how some general   6
attributes of the policy initiatives (Zs) interact with the institutional variables (Xs). In particular, 
we address the scope (national, regional, local, or individual focus) and the intent (distribution of 
benefits to particular constituencies, redistribution of wealth, or regulation of social and 
economic activity) of the policies under consideration. Our conclusions suggest that the current 
Paraguayan PMP may be flexible for the provision of particularistic benefits but is rigid for the 
approval of broad regulatory or redistributive policies. 
The study of the Paraguayan case offers valuable theoretical insights regarding two 
issues. First, in recent years an emerging literature has emphasized that the presence of multiple 
veto players (political actors whose consent is necessary but not sufficient to alter the policy 
status-quo) reinforces policy rigidities and prevents policy change (Tsebelis, 2002). We show 
that, to some extent, this has been the case in Paraguay: the democratization process begun in 
1989 multiplied the number of potential veto players and thus made policy change more difficult. 
However, we also show that concentration of power in a policy dictator (a single player whose 
consent is necessary and sufficient to alter policies) does not guarantee policy adaptability: when 
the dictator is able to transfer the costs of failure to somebody else (as the Stroessner regime did 
in the 1980s), he or she has little incentive to correct inefficient policies. Second, there is 
uncertainty in the political economy literature with regards to the relationship between the 
dimensions of policy adaptability-rigidity and public-private regardedness. Publicly-regarded 
policies tend to generate public goods, while privately-regarded policies tend to generate private 
goods or benefits for narrowly targeted sectors (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). We show that these 
two dimensions are in fact orthogonal: while levels of policy adaptability in Paraguay varied 
considerably over time, private-regardedness has been constant, as the system has been 
historically marked by patronage and clientelism.  
 
2. The Policymaking Process under Stroessner (1954-1989) 
On May 4, 1954, after seven years of unstable one-party rule, a military coup removed President 
Federico Chaves from office. The leader of the coup, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, soon gained 
control over the Executive Branch, the Colorado Party and the Army, establishing a regime that 
would last for almost 35 years. Stroessner held office longer than any other ruler in Paraguayan 
history, and by 1989 approximately 75 percent of the population had grown up under the   7
Stroessner regime, which was characterized by fear, repression and co-optation, and therefore 
had no experience with democratic rule (Lambert and Nickson, 1997).  
This section outlines the structure and evolution of the policymaking process (PMP) 
during the Stronismo period. It argues that the basic structure of the PMP remained generally 
constant over this period: the Chief Executive was a dictator not only in the political sense of the 
term, but also in the technical sense because his approval was both necessary and sufficient to 
implement policy change. This concentration of power also fostered policy adaptability during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. However, when several conditions changed in the 1980s, they were not 
successfully addressed by the Stroessner regime and policy rigidity ensued.  
2.1  The Players and the Rules 
2.1.1 The Dictator 
For more than 34 years, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner managed a “cooperative” arrangement among 
state officials in all three branches of government and the bureaucracy, the Colorado Party, and 
the Armed Forces. This so-called “triumvirate” of power (State-Party-Army) was based on a 
single premise: that Stroessner would remain in office for the foreseeable future.
2 Stroessner’s re-
election was secured through several mechanisms. First, repression against political dissidents 
was backed up by a “permanent” (i.e., renewed every 90 days) State of Siege and by ambiguous 
regulations, such as Law 209, which penalized “fostering hatred among Paraguayans” as a 
criminal offense. Second, the system established a culture of fear due to the arrest, torture, and 
death or exile of selected opposition leaders. This selective repression, combined with a 
widespread informal network of political spies, was internalized by the population, with the 
result that repression on a large scale was not always necessary given the distrust and suspicion 
that dominated the country. Third, the Colorado Party was strengthened nationwide, rewarding 
membership with economic and political incentives under the patronage system that tied people 
to the regime at all social levels. Fourth, after two elections with Stroessner as the only candidate 
(in 1954 and 1958), there was a tightly controlled multi-party system with limited political 
activity granted to selected opposition parties (1962-1989).  
Under this system, Stroessner was elected to office eight times, with 98.4 percent of the 
vote in 1954; 97.3 percent in 1958, 90.6 percent in 1963, 70.9 percent in 1968; 83.6 percent in 
                                                 
2 Originally, the 1967 Constitution established re-election for only one more period; but after the 1977 reform the 
president could be indefinitely re-elected.   8
1973, 90.0 percent in 1978, 90.1 percent in 1983, and 88.6 percent in 1988 (Lambert, 1997). 
According to the electoral law in place since the late 1950s, the winning party in a “competitive 
election” was granted 67 percent of the seats in Congress. Congressional representatives could be 
re-elected indefinitely. Following the legal precedent of previous charters, the 1967 Constitution 
gave Stroessner great powers over Congress and the judiciary. The president was able to dissolve 
Congress without restrictions, and Congress had no ability to convene itself. Congress was not an 
important arena of policymaking because: a) the initiative for all major policymaking was 
expected to come from the Executive, and b) legislators had no real veto power. The role of 
Congress—as well as the judiciary—was merely to provide a democratic façade and it was 
therefore expected to be supportive of the Executive’s policy initiatives. Hence, Stroessner and 
key collaborators from the Colorado Party and the Armed Forces that surrounded him made all 
policymaking decisions.  
2.1.2 The Colorado Party 
Stroessner transformed the Colorado Party from a party deeply divided along factional lines into 
a highly united and vertically organized political instrument (Lambert, 1997: 5-7). He purged the 
party of opposition, converted it into an instrument that legitimized his regime, and used this 
mass-based, agrarian party to mobilize support and repress opposition. 
Between 1954 and 1966, Stroessner consolidated his own control over the Colorado Party 
by selectively purging internal party opponents (Lambert, 1997). As a result of these moves, 
Stroessner imposed a “granitic unity” on the party through repression and expulsion of internal 
opposition and through the promotion of politicians loyal to him. Thus, the Colorado Party 
became a unified, mass-based party with extensive control of the media, patronage resources and 
extensive grassroots support. 
The Colorado Party developed a nationwide network of seccionales (local party offices) 
that mobilized support for the regime and represented the “eyes and ears” of the government, 
employing thousands of spies to report anti-government sentiment among the population 
(Lambert, 1997). Unopposed elections of centrally nominated candidates at the seccionales 
guaranteed tight control over the party. Moreover, the seccionales administered the political 
patronage system.  
Membership in the party was mandatory for all state employees (teachers, members of 
the Armed Forces, judges, etc). Patronage, dispersed mainly through the Party, tied people of all   9
social levels to the regime. By 1989, state employees accounted for 9 percent of the labor force 
(Nickson, 1997), and the Colorado Party was partially funded by compulsory deductions from 
public employees’ salaries. In exchange for public employment, public employees attended 
meetings and parades, donated part of their income to the Party (automatically deducted from 
their paychecks), and even bought a compulsory subscription to the Colorado newspaper, Patria 
(Arditi, 1993: 164). Senior Party members received lucrative contracts for state projects, 
holdings in public companies and other opportunities to become successful businessmen 
(Lambert, 1997: 7). 
2.1.3 The Armed Forces 
The Armed Forces did not govern in their own right, but represented a key component of the 
trilogy of power during Stroessner’s regime (integrated by the State, the Colorado Party, and the 
Armed Forces). The alliance between the Colorado Party and the Armed Forces was 
consolidated in 1947 (seven years before Stroessner took over) after a short but brutal civil war 
that depleted the military of 90 percent of its officer corps (Lambert, 1997: 5). After the civil 
war, the Armed Forces were re-organized under the supervision of the Colorado Party. 
Stroessner, however, strengthened this alliance through the mandatory membership of 
military officers in the Colorado Party, and by unifying his command as President, Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces and Honorary President of the Colorado Party. Throughout the 
1950s Stroessner brought the military under his own control. While disloyalty was punished, 
loyalty was rewarded with promotion and economic privileges. Military officials had access to 
land and lucrative positions in state monopolies, as well as a free hand in illicit businesses such 
as widespread contraband. 
Given this consolidation of power, the government, the Colorado Party and the Armed 
Forces had long time horizons during the 1960s and the 1970s. The incentive structure was stable 
and the partnership remained cohesive and strong. The main enforcer of the inter-temporal deals 
was Stroessner himself, and the main deterrent to defection from Stroessner’s policymaking 
game was punishment for disloyal behavior. .   10
2.1.4 The Bureaucracy 
For the most part, the bureaucracy remained a secondary player during this period. Although 
“threatening” ministers like Edgar L. Ynsfrán were eventually purged, Stroessner preserved a 
rather stable cast of characters in the Cabinet. In the early 1980s, Paul Lewis noted: 
 
...There has been a tendency for the stronato’s governing elite to become a 
gerontocracy. General Marcial Samaniego, the defense minister, and General 
César Barrientos, the finance minister, are old army friends of Stroessner’s who 
have served in his government from the beginning. Raúl Peña, the education 
minister, Tomás Romero Pereira, the minister without portfolio, and Raúl Sapena 
Pastor, who recently retired as foreign minister, have also served more than 20 
years in their posts. Sabino Montanaro, the minister of interior, is a 15-year 
veteran on the cabinet. Saúl González (justice), Hernando Bertoni (agriculture), 
and Adán Godoy Giménez (health) have all served more than 10 years. So did 
Ynsfrán, who for 11 years at the Ministry of Interior was reputed to be the second 
most powerful man in the country (Lewis, 1982: 73). 
  
 
The presence of a stable ministerial team was consistent with the privately regarded 
policymaking process (and ultimately with the emergence of policy rigidities) more than with the 
development of a highly trained and stable bureaucracy. Although some “islands of excellence” 
were attempted (for instance, the Secretaría Técnica de Planificación was created in 1962 under 
the aegis of the Alliance for Progress), their impact on the overall PMP was limited. For the most 
part, public employment remained the main instrument of cooptation controlled by the Colorado 
Party.  
In this scheme, public wages remained generally depressed; they were somewhat 
attractive for major political posts (like Congress and the State Council) and for key technical 
agencies (like the Central Bank) but lower for most public workers. According to Campos and 
Canese, the average public wage in 1987 was 16 percent below the minimum wage established 
by the government. The authors claimed that the gap was simply “a recourse to create a broader 
political clientele, because with the same funds there are more posts-clients of the party in 
government functions” (Campos and Canese, 1987: 78).   
2.1.5 Underlying Rules of the PMP 
During these 34 years of dictatorship, the Paraguayan policymaking process was based on four 
simple rules. First, the executive branch was to be the source of any changes to the status quo.   11
Congress was not expected to be the locus of policy innovation, and responsibility for policy 
performance was exclusively the president’s. Second, a cohesive ruling party was expected to 
support the president’s proposals in Congress (Lewis, 1982). A legislative career was essentially 
the reward for politicians loyal to the president, and the Colorado Party was always guaranteed a 
majority (and even a two-thirds supermajority) under the “incomplete list” electoral system in 
force until 1992. Third, the judiciary was expected to shield the president’s policies from 
external challenges. Fourth, it was assumed that disgruntled social actors could be co-opted, 
bribed or repressed to accept new policies.  
This system generated a dictator, not only in the literal sense but also in the technical 
sense—a player whose acquiescence is both necessary and sufficient to alter the policy status 
quo. To sustain this arrangement, two lasting deals were enforced: the first allowed major 
military leaders to control illegal rent-seeking activities (smuggling operations, drug trafficking), 
and the second allowed the Colorado politicians to control the distribution of patronage positions 
in the public administration. Within this general framework, specific intertemporal policy 
agreements were viable but for the most part irrelevant, because politicians and military officers 
had delegated the policymaking function to the Executive. 
2.2 The Outer Features of Public Policies, 1954-1989 
Policies in Paraguay were characterized by their low public regardedness throughout the entire 
1954-1989 period. Their purpose was to benefit mainly the loyal members of the Colorado Party 
and the Armed Forces. The Paraguayan PMP also fostered adaptable public policies between 
1954-1981, but tended toward much more rigid policies in the 1982-89 period. Cooperative 
arrangements among key stakeholders of the Stroessner regime were easier to sustain during the 
first sub-period because of two conditions: (i) a long time horizon for the regime based on 
Stroessner leadership, and (ii) the absence of acute recessionary conditions. When these 
conditions were affected, the ability of the regime to mobilize resources for policy change 
declined and the regime lost much of its capacity to adapt to exogenous shocks. 
2.2.1 Adaptable Policies, 1954-81 
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, Stroessner’s articulation of the Armed Forces, the Colorado 
Party and the government reinforced the expectations of a long time horizon for the regime. 
Paraguay’s macroeconomic conditions also made it easier to sustain “cooperative” arrangements   12
throughout this period. For example, the average growth rate for 1961-65 was approximately 2.5 
percent per year, with no significant GDP contractions. 
2.2.2 Adaptability: Long-Term Horizon and Non-Recessionary Conditions, 1954-81 
Within the first years of the regime, Stroessner reversed some of the nationalistic policies of the 
1940s (for instance, the monopoly on the internal beef trade controlled by the Paraguayan Meat 
Corporation, Copacar). In 1957, a major IMF-sponsored stabilization program involved the 
deregulation of trade, the reduction of the monetary base, cuts in public expenditures and a wage 
freeze. The ensuing stand-by loan in 1957-61 and the recovery of foreign credit allowed for an 
extensive road construction program (Campos and Canese, 1987: 27). 
In the late 1960s, the distribution of public land and subsidized agricultural credit 
promoted the emergence of a local agricultural business sector related to the regime. This sector 
took advantage of the boom in soybean and cotton production during the following decade. At 
the same time, the construction of the Itaipú dam in the 1970s encouraged the emergence of a 
large construction sector, from less than 22 family-owned construction companies in the early 
1970s to some 250 corporations after the Itaipú period (Borda, 1993: 76).   
In fact, the Stroessner regime showed a significant ability to reap the benefits offered by 
long-term economic opportunities. This tendency was certainly reinforced by its capacity to 
impose intertemporal policy deals. For instance, development toward the Brazilian border in 
order to diversify a dependent pattern of economic relationships with Argentina required large 
investments and an active and stable foreign policy. This large-scale movement toward the 
eastern border required coordination of land distribution, internal rural migration and massive 
construction, among other initiatives, and was possible because of the intertemporal 
“cooperation” of the key actors (the government, the Party and the Armed Forces). The 
adaptation of the development model to allow for increasing integration with Brazil would have 
been unlikely under short-lived governments like the ones characterizing the post-Chaco war 
period (1936-1954). During that 18-year period, there were 12 different presidents, and political 
volatility prevented an adaptation to changing economic environments. 
During the 1956-1981 period, the government distributed more than 88,000 farms 
covering 7.4 million hectares in 48 colonies (Lynn Ground, 1984). This land distribution 
represented 59 percent of the existing farms in 1956 and 35 percent of the existing farms in 1981. 
During the 1960s and the 1970s, Paraguay built roads, silos and, most importantly, the biggest   13
dam in the world, the Itaipú Hydro-electric Dam, built jointly with Brazil. The long-term growth 
strategy turned out to be effective. During the 1960s, real GDP growth was 4.2 percent. During 
the 1970s, Paraguay had one of the highest growth rates in the region, with real GDP increasing 
at 8 percent over the decade. 
2.2.3 Rigid Policies, 1982-89 
In contrast to the 1954-1981 period, the “shadow of the future” was becoming increasingly 
shorter by the mid-1980s. The main reason was the dictator’s age and his (perceived) health 
deterioration, particularly after 1987 (Abente Brun, 1993: 147). Since the enforcer of the 
intertemporal agreements was Stroessner himself, the problem of succession was a big one. In 
contrast to less institutionalized neo-patrimonial regimes in which power was easily transferred 
to the dictator’s son after his death (Nicaragua in 1956, Haiti in 1971), the Militantes (the faction 
that sought a dynastic solution to the succession problem) confronted autonomous groups within 
the Colorado Party and the Armed Forces. Consistent with the prediction of the folk theorem in 
game theory, this intertemporal cooperation was more difficult to sustain when the end of the 
game was approaching with less uncertainty. In fact, the end of the Stroessner regime was 
ultimately the consequence of a struggle for succession (Martini and Lezcano, 1997). 
The twilight of Stroessner’s regime coincided with increasingly harsh economic 
conditions. Following the conclusion of the Itaipú Dam project, the Paraguayan economy entered 
a deep recession that lasted well into the 1980s. At the same time, the debt crisis hurt two of 
Paraguay’s main trade partners, Brazil and Argentina. Paraguay’s GDP declined for two 
consecutive years, leaving production 4 percent lower in 1983 than in 1981. Growth resumed in 
1984, but the average rate during 1984-86 was well below population growth (World Bank, 
1992).  
The sectors that suffered most after 1982—construction, commerce and finance—were 
those that had grown most rapidly in the 1970s boom. By now, the support of these sectors had 
become very important for the Stroessner regime. Instead of forcing the domestic economy into 
conformity with the external conditions, the government tried to avert the post-Itaipú recession 
by continuing with its investment and spending programs. These policies only piled a financial 
disequilibrium on top of the recession. The economy still stagnated and inflation accelerated. To 
finance its increased spending, the government sharply increased its external borrowing. 
Medium- and long-term debt (including arrears) rose from 15 percent of GDP in 1981 to 62   14
percent in 1987. Moreover, the external funds were largely used on unprofitable projects, which 
added to macroeconomic instability and eventually led to the suspension of disbursements from 
several creditors (World Bank, 1992).  
2.2.4 Low Public Regardedness, 1954-89 
Stronismo provides a good example of the independence between policy adaptability and public-
regardedness. Even during its “golden” years, membership in the Colorado Party was a 
requirement for conducting business with the government, and an extensive patronage system 
was administered by a nationwide network of seccionales. According to Fogel, the resources 
invested in the hydroelectric dams (76 percent to Itaipú and 24 percent to Yasyretá) were 
“channelled by a reduced group of civilian and military followers of the dictator nucleated in few 
companies (...) and ultimately devoted to speculation, the development of financial enterprises, 
and the acquisition of ranches; therefore the powerful economic groups integrated themselves to 
new economic sectors” (Fogel, 1993: 16). 
Campos and Canese ( 1987: 88-104) identified a series of “inconvenient” public 
investments that began in the second half of the 1970s. Among them were the ACEPAR steel 
plant, the airport near President Stroessner City (today Ciudad del Este), the bridge over the 
Paraguay River at the level of Concepción City, the purchase of military helicopters and vessels, 
the construction of large hospitals and the Chaco telecommunications program. The authors 
claimed that these projects shared a common pattern characterized by a dubious need for the 
venture, an oversized plan, the impossibility of recovering the investment, the evaluation of the 
proposal by interested parties, a resort to foreign loans, the avoidance of public bidding and a 
systematic recourse to foreign suppliers. In trying to explain these “white elephants,” the authors 
concluded that “the large magnitude of the public sector expenditures (...) leads to the conclusion 
that this is one of the most important ways to generate a surplus that is concentrated by a small 
number of people” (Campos and Canese, 1987: 82). 
The lack of public regardedness also reinforced the policy rigidities of the 1980s. As an 
example of this problem, the recession of the 1980s did not lead to a reduction in clientelism or 
patronage politics. On the contrary, public employment—which had grown at an average 4.5 
percent per year in 1975-80—grew at a 4.8 percent rate in 1980-84, and at a 5.6 percent rate in 
1984-87 (Campos and Canese, 198:, 65). The total number of public jobs expanded from 82,000 
in 1980 to 119,000 in 1989 (Campos and Canese, 1990: Table 4). In 1982, prior to the 1983   15
general election, the total wage bill in the public sector (excluding state enterprises) grew by 19 
percent, just at a time when the economy was decelerating. As a result, the share of public wages 
on total public consumption grew from 58 percent in 1981 to 68 percent in the following years. 
3. The Post-Dictatorial Period (1989-1992) 
On February 3, 1989, a coup led by General Andrés Rodríguez drove Alfredo Stroessner out of 
power and initiated the transition to democracy. During this transitional period, the policymaking 
process initially operated under the existing rules—but now under a new leadership. It was not 
until 1992 that the adoption of a new constitution re-structured the underlying rules of the game.  
Following the “standard procedure” in place since 1954, Gen. Rodríguez was nominated 
as the Colorado candidate for the May 1989 presidential election and won with 74 percent of the 
vote. However, the collapse of the old regime had three consequences. In the short run, the 
arrival of a new coalition, combined with a PMP that remained centered on the Executive, 
allowed for a new period of rapid policy change. In the medium run, the internal struggles within 
the new coalition progressively eroded the president’s control over the Colorado Party and 
planted the seed of factionalism discussed below. In the long run, increasing respect for civil 
liberties and the adoption of a new constitution in 1992 facilitated the incorporation of new 
players into the policymaking process—and thus multiplied the number of veto points.    
3.1 New Players, Old Rules 
3.1.1 The End of Party Unity 
The atomization of the Colorado Party took place in five stages, starting with the election of a 
Constituent Assembly in late 1991 and leading to the  ANR splinter in 2003:  
1) Although the Colorado Party won a majority of the seats in the 1992 Constituent 
Assembly, the presence of internal factions created room for the formation of 
strategic coalitions with opposition forces. For instance, the Colorado leaders from 
the hinterland (the “Bancada Campesina”) managed to establish the constitutional 
bases for the decentralization process (Barreda and Costafreda, 2002: 80), and the 
faction led by Luis M. Argaña was able to impose a constitutional ban on 
Rodríguez’s presidential re-election.  
2) In response to this move, the commander of the Cavalry and President Rodríguez’s 
right-hand man, Gen. Lino Oviedo, blocked Argaña’s presidential ambitions. In late   16
1992, when Luis M. Argaña and Juan Carlos Wasmosy confronted each other in the 
presidential primary, Oviedo intervened in the vote-counting process to ensure the 
defeat of Argaña. This move placed Gen. Oviedo in a highly influential position 
during the new Wasmosy administration after 1993.  
3) In 1996, the conflicts within the Colorado Party entered a new phase. The insistence 
of Gen. Oviedo on encroaching in the political process eventually led to a showdown 
with President Wasmosy. In April of 1996, Wasmosy ordered the retirement of his 
military ally and Oviedo responded with a failed insurrection (Ayala Bogarín and 
Costa, 1996). This action ultimately led to Oviedo’s arrest and justified his 
proscription in the 1998 general election, even though the general had emerged as 
the favorite candidate in the Colorado primary, defeating Luis M. Argaña.    
4) Because Oviedo was under arrest, his running mate Raúl Cubas Grau was named the 
official Colorado candidate for 1998. For legal reasons, Luis M. Argaña became his 
vice-president. President Cubas’ decision to release Oviedo from prison immediately 
after he took office in August of 1998 created a new confrontation with the Argaña 
faction and an impeachment threat from Congress. There was some speculation that 
Congress would remove President Cubas and install Argaña as the new chief 
executive when the vice-president was shot and killed in March 1999. Argaña’s 
killing triggered a wave of protests (known as the “Paraguayan March”) that ended 
with the resignation of Cubas and the installation of Luis González Macchi as 
interim president. 
5) Over the next three years, the Oviedista faction reciprocated by attempting to unseat 
President González Macchi several times. A failed military coup took place in May 
2000 and, in the midst of several corruption scandals, the Oviedistas and the Liberal 
Party attempted to impeach González Macchi at least three times.
3 Still in exile and 
banned from running in the presidential election, Gen. Oviedo ordered the 
transformation of his Colorado faction into a new party, Unace (Unión Nacional de 
Colorados Eticos), for the 2003 race.
4 
 
                                                 
3 An impeachment finally took place in early 2003, but the Senate acquitted González Macchi. 
4 Lino Oviedo returned to Paraguay in late June 2004. At the time of this writing, he was facing a sentence of 10 
years in prison.    17
The “triumvirate” of the Colorado  Party, the government, and the military that had 
characterized the Stroessner regime was significantly weakened by this transition process. 
Internal factionalism became the norm in the Party, and traditional Colorado-military relations 
deteriorated. In this context, new regulations instituted party primaries, banned the practice of 
deducting contributions to the Colorado Party from public sector paychecks and prevented party 
affiliation among military officers.  
3.1.2 Toward a Plural PMP 
Since 1989, Paraguay has been undergoing a slow but steady processes of democratization and 
decentralization. Freedom of speech and association have been granted to the people; elections 
have become free and progressively cleaner; a new constitution guaranteed a more balanced 
relationship among the Executive, Congress and the judiciary; advances have been made toward 
the renovation of the judiciary system and many judges appointed for political reasons under the 
dictatorial regime have been removed.  
The recovery of political rights by Paraguayan citizens was reflected in the electoral 
participation of new political forces. During the transitional period, the emergence of 
independent candidates and new political forces challenged the two-party system that had 
characterized Paraguayan politics. Independent candidates ran for positions in the National 
Assembly in late 1991. A new political party, the middle-class Partido Encuentro Nacional 
(PEN) achieved 23 percent of the total presidential votes in the 1993 election. Additional parties 
(Oviedo’s Unace, the Movimiento Patria Querida, and País Solidario) emerged in the early 
2000s.  
As the democratic transition process has unfolded, the opposition represented by the 
Liberal Party (PLRA) and the new political forces has increasingly gained access to the 
policymaking process. The executive branch for the most part has remained under Colorado 
control (exceptions to this rule have been the capture of the vice-president’s office by the 
Liberals in the 2000 election, and the incorporation of the PEN into the Cabinet in 1999-2003), 
but the adoption of proportional representation has made the congressional arena increasingly 
pluralistic. Figure 1 depicts the transformation of Paraguay from a hegemonic party system into a   18
multiparty system, using the effective number of parties index (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979).
5 
Before 1963, when Stroessner allowed token opposition into Congress, the effective number of 
parties was 1.0. Between 1963 and 1992, the average effective number of parties was 1.9. During 
the last decade, however, multipartyism has emerged in the Paraguayan Congress, with 3.2 
effective parties currently in the Chamber of Deputies. 
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3.2 The Outer Features of Public Policies during the Transition 
Between 1989 and 1993, the transitional regime preserved the executive-centered policymaking 
process under the command of a new chief executive. This PMP structure generated two results: 
the continuation of previous public policies (i.e., policy stability) along the dimensions in which 
the policy preferences of the old and the new regime coincided, and rapid policy change along 
the dimensions in which the preferences of the old and new regimes diverged.  
In some key aspects, the respective policy preferences of the Stroessner and Rodríguez 
Administrations diverged, and an initial flurry of policy reform took place in the early 1990s. 
After a long period of post-Itaipú rigidity, economic policies during the transitional period 
                                                 
5 The Effective Number of Parties is an index akin to the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of market concentration 
(HHI) that weights the distribution of legislative seats among political parties. The formula for the index is 
ENP=1/Σ(p
2), where p represents the proportion of seats controlled by each party in the lower chamber.   19
(1989-1993) targeted the deregulation of the economy. This process included exchange-rate 
liberalization, substantial tariff reductions, deregulation of agricultural prices and deregulation of 
interest rates (Análisis del Mes, December 1989, 1990, 1991). The first year of the Rodríguez 
Administration was marked by the elimination of the multiple, fixed exchange-rate system, a 
reduction of tariffs and the liberalization of agricultural prices. In 1990, the Administration 
liberalized interest rates and signed Law 60/90 for the promotion of foreign investment. A year 
later, Paraguay joined Mercosur (with Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay), reducing by 47 percent 
all tariffs for member products not included in the exceptions list. A goal of zero tariffs was set 
for 1996. That same year, the government reduced the required reserves in the Central Bank for 
bank deposits and signed Law 117/91 establishing equal treatment for national and foreign 
investors (who became eligible to receive investment-promotion incentives). Paraguay also 
joined the Organización Multilateral de Garantías de Inversiones (MIGA) for coverage against 
losses due to non-commercial risks. In 1992 there was a new reduction of tariffs and a tax reform 
that involved the creation of a value-added tax and a simplification of the tax structure. 
Following this impulse, in 1993 the incoming Wasmosy Administration allowed public 
companies and the Social Security Institute (IPS) to transfer their deposits to the private banking 
system. At the same time, foreign-denominated loans were authorized for the private sector. The 
Rodríguez and Wasmosy administrations also privatized a few medium-sized public companies: 
LAPSA airlines (Líneas Aéras Paraguayas), the merchant fleet (Flota Mercante del Estado), the 
ACEPAR steel company (Aceros del Paraguay) and the Paraguayan Administration of Sugar-
Cane Spirits (APAL).  
Other policy initiatives, like land-tenure policies, were less of a priority for the Rodríguez 
Administration, and the implementation of reforms in these areas was slow and incomplete. 
However, in the context of increasing public liberties, policy rigidity was confronted by the re-
emergence of the peasant movement. Peasant mobilization was another signal of the growing 
pluralism in the policymaking process.  
Although some public policies moved from rigidity to adaptability in the early 1990s, low 
public regardedness remained a constant outer feature. Changes in the judiciary system were 
slow; in 1991 government resources were still used to finance the Colorado Party in elections 
(Análisis del Mes, December 1991); high-ranked military officers were still quite active in party 
politics until 1996 (Análisis del Mes, December 1994; December 1995; December 1996); there   20
was still violent repression of peasant demonstrations (Análisis del Mes, December 1994), and 
corruption was not seriously addressed. For example, in 1990 the Executive vetoed a law to 
create a National Commission of Investigation of Corruption against the Public Sector; high 
government officials under the dictatorship were given light punishment for corruption and 
human right violations (most sentences ranged from two to five years in prison), and accusations 
of corruption in the Armed Forces were not seriously investigated.  
4. The Emergence of a New Policymaking Process (1993-2003) 
Economic policies in the early 1990s mainly focused on tax reforms, the balance of payments 
liberalization, financial liberalization, price deregulation and the privatization of a few medium-
sized public enterprises. However, most policy reforms took place from 1989-1992, and only 
marginal changes have occurred afterwards. This section seeks to characterize the emerging 
PMP during the period following the establishment of the new Constitution. This period includes 
the Wasmosy (1993-1998), Cubas Grau (1998-1999) and González Macchi (1999-2003) 
Administrations, and the first semester of the Duarte Frutos government (August-December 
2003). The first sub-section shows that the number of veto players and the rules of the PMP have 
changed considerably since 1993. The second sub-section discusses how the new conditions 
affect the outer features of public policies.  
4.1 Players in the Democratic Era 
This section provides a brief discussion of the workings of the Paraguayan policymaking process 
following the adoption of the 1992 Constitution. We first describe the institutional players 
according to the new constitution, and then we attempt to map the rules of the PMP. Because the 
underlying rules of the new PMP are in many ways still unchartered, the following section relies 
on detailed bill-initiation data to identify emerging regularities in the process. 
4.1.1 The Executive 
The Executive Branch has been considerably weakened by the 1992 constitution. The 
Constitutional Assembly established that the president and vice-president would be elected by 
plurality for five-year terms with no re-election. It also deprived the president of the power to 
dissolve Congress, and endowed the Executive with relatively weak “proactive” and “reactive”   21
powers.
6 The Paraguayan president can enforce policies unilaterally only if Congress fails to 
address an urgent bill within 60 days,
7 and his line-item veto can be overridden by an absolute 
majority of Congress.  
4.1.2 Congress 
Deputies and senators are elected in concurrent elections every five years and can be re-elected 
indefinitely. The Paraguayan Chamber of Deputies has 80 members who are elected from 18 
districts for five-year terms. The deputies are elected from closed party lists using the d’Hondt 
divisor form of proportional representation in relatively small districts (the average district 
magnitude is 4.4). In theory, the closed-list system creates little incentives to cultivate the 
“personal vote” (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Hallerberg and Marier, 2004) but, as is shown below, 
legally mandated party primaries and relatively small districts have encouraged particularistic 
politics in the lower chamber.  
The Chamber of Deputies has 25 standing committees. Committee positions are allocated 
among the parties by the president of the Chamber in rough proportion to the percentage of seats 
held by the parties in the Chamber. Chamber rules do not restrict multiple assignments, but each 
committee must have a minimum of six members. Committee assignments in the 2003 legislative 
period, for example, required every member to fill an average of 1.89 slots, which is the 
minimum number required on average to fill the 150 existing slots. Nonetheless, the average 
Paraguayan deputy served on more than one additional committee (3.1 committees). This 
suggests that committee membership imposes few costs on members. But since time and effort 
are limited resources, legislators serving on a larger number of committees are less able to 
specialize. Committee chairs are not distributed entirely to the majority party, and in 2003, the 
majority party received 60 percent of the committee chairs. Seniority in the Chamber does not 
play a significant role in the allocation of committee chairmanships. The percentage of 
                                                 
6 Consistent with Shugart and Carey, Payne et al. presented the reactive powers of the Paraguayan president as 
“moderate” vis-à-vis the “weak” reactive powers of the Costa Rican and Honduran presidents who presumably lack 
partial veto powers (Payne et al., 2002; Shugart and Carey, 1992). The fact is that articles 126-127 of the Costa 
Rican Constitution allow the president to “amend” bills passed by Congress and return them to the Assembly for 
reconsideration, and article 220 of the Honduran Constitution is ambiguous about the possibility of a partial veto.  
7 The 1992 Constitution (art. 210) further constrains the president’s proactive powers in three ways: 1) the president 
is not allowed to issue unilateral decrees and must instead introduce “urgent” bills in Congress (which he can legally 
enforce if Congress fails to act in 60 days); 2) the president is not allowed to introduce more than three urgent bills 
per year; and 3) Congress can lift the urgency character of a bill with two-thirds of the votes, reverting to the normal 
policymaking process. Because of this reason, the Paraguayan proactive powers are generally “toothless.”    22
committee chairs who served more than two periods in the legislature (28 percent) is roughly the 
same as the percentage of all deputies with a similar tenure (32 percent). 
The Senate consists of 45 members elected from closed party lists in a nation-wide 
electoral district. Thus, in contrast to the deputies who have clear incentives to promote 
departmental interests, senators do not represent local elites but rather visible party figures at the 
national level. In other respects, the Paraguayan bicameral system is highly congruent—meaning 
that the partisan composition of the House and the Senate is usually quite similar (Lijphart, 1999; 
Llanos, 2002).  
Although congressional re-election is not banned by the Constitution, the electoral 
context, marked by competitive primaries, increasing party factionalism and new political parties 
has created greater uncertainty about the political survival of legislators. In 1998, 54 percent of 
the deputies were re-elected—a figure comparable to Chile’s lower house (Morgenstern, 2002, 
416). Five years later, only 21 percent of the deputies remained in their seats, a situation that 
resembled the turnover of Argentina’s “amateur” legislators (Jones et al., 2002).
8 The decline 
was consistent across all major parties.  
4.1.3 Political Parties 
Historically, partisan politics in Paraguay have centered on the competition between two 
nineteenth-century organizations: the Colorados (or the National Republican Association, ANR) 
and the Liberals (nowadays called the Authentic Radical Liberals, PLRA). Although the ANR is 
still the largest party (winning 67 percent of the seats in the lower chamber in 1989, 50 percent in 
1993, 56 percent in 1998, and 46 percent in 2003), the Liberals were able to capture the vice-
presidency in the 2000 election (which was scheduled to fill the vacant position after the vice 
president was killed in 1999). Smaller middle-class parties (Encuentro Nacional, País Solidario 
and Patria Querida) and a Colorado splinter (Unace) have been able to capture a few seats in 
Congress.  
At the same time, the “granitic unity” of the ruling party during the Stroessner era has 
given way to factionalism and increasing internal competition in the form of (legally mandated) 
                                                 
8 These figures are estimates of unconditional re-election, based on roll-call data. We do not know how many 
deputies were actually placed in the lists.   23
primary elections to define the candidacies and the composition of party conventions.
9 Figure 2 
below displays the evolution of the Rice index of party unity for the Colorado and the Liberal 
parties in the Chamber of Deputies over the last nine years. The Rice index ranges from 0, when 
the party is evenly split on any legislative vote, to 100, when all the members of the party vote 
together (Rice, 1925).
10 Because the Chamber of Deputies, in contrast to the Senate, collects roll-
call votes on a regular basis, albeit was possible to estimate the cohesion scores using 1,409 
controversial votes since 1995.
11  
Figure 2 suggests that the cohesion of Paraguayan parties at present is quite low. At the 
peak of the factional confrontation in 1999, the Colorado Party reached an abysmal unity score 
of just 30 points. The average ANR score during the González Macchi administration was 43 
points. In contrast to the ANR, the PLRA has shown increasing cohesion over time, but its Rice 
scores are not particularly high (75 on average for all years and 81 during the best year). In a 
comparative study, John Carey found average Rice scores of 91 points for Mexican parties, 81 
for Chilean parties, 79 for Peruvian and Uruguayan parties, 75 for Brazilian parties, and 88 for 
Argentine parties (Carey, 2002). In his study of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies, Mark Jones 
found that the two largest parties (PJ and UCR) consistently had scores above 90 points between 
1989 and 1997 (Jones, 2002).
12 
                                                 
9 The practice of bitter factional disputes within the two traditional parties was interrupted in the Colorado Party by 
the “granitic” leadership of Alfredo Stroessner (1954-89), but it remained an essential part of the Liberal Party even 
during this period. 
10 The formula for the index is R=|Ayes−Nays|/(Ayes+Nays)*100 
11 Controversial votes were defined as decisions in which at least 25 percent of the legislators voted against the 
winning side (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 1997). The focus on controversial votes guarantees that minor 
legislative decisions, which are normally consensual and thus inflate party unity scores, are not given undue 
influence.   
12 Comparison of unity scores is always difficult because roll-call votes are not equally frequent in all legislatures 
and researchers select votes using slightly different criteria. Instead of dropping all non-controversial votes, Carey 
weighted votes according to their closeness and the number of legislators absent. Jones provided “relative” unity 
scores, ignoring absent legislators and abstentions.    24
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4.1.4 The Judiciary 
The 1992 Constitution included several provisions intended to reform the judicial system. The 
new charter included a broad definition of human rights and established a new framework for the 
court system, and also sought to promote judicial independence: the Constitution mandated that 3 
percent of public expenditures be allocated to the judiciary and decreed that judges were not 
allowed to hold partisan posts. In addition, a jury to prosecute judges (independent from the 
Supreme Court’s control) and a Consejo de la Magistratura to select judges were established. 
However, many of these initiatives were never fully implemented (or implemented at all). The 
result was a somewhat more autonomous, but hardly competent judiciary. According to a survey 
conducted by the World Bank Institute in 1999, the Paraguayan judiciary’s institutional 
performance is relatively poor and its functionaries are perceived as being particularly corrupt 
(Plan Nacional Anticorrupcion, 2000). In terms of its institutional performance, the judiciary is 
ranked below average in as areas including quality of service, quantity of service, cost of 
provision and accessibility (Plan Nacional Anticorrupción, 2000: 28).    25
4.1.5 The Bureaucracy 
In spite of the democratic process initiated in 1993, but consistent with an inability to introduce 
important policy reforms, post-Stroessner Paraguay has not been able to develop an effective, 
relatively independent, yet accountable bureaucracy. In 2000, Law 1626/00 sought to 
modernization the public service career by establishing a clearer system of selection, training, 
promotion and retirement. Among its key features was the creation of the Secretaria de la 
Función Pública with the rank of a Ministry. This secretary of state was in charge of increasing 
rationalization, transparency and efficiency in human resource management. However, the Law 
has been challenged by unconstitutional charges, substantially delaying its full application 
(World Bank, 2003). Thus, Paraguay does not have clear descriptions of public positions, an 
effective training system, procedures manuals, a consistent scale of public salaries or any 
performance evaluation of public employees (World Bank, 2003).  
Moreover, the factionalization that has characterized Paraguayan politics in the post-
Stroessner period has permeated the public bureaucracy. Public hiring practices are characterized 
by a high degree of arbitrariness. These hiring practices are based principally on political favors 
and the support of political parties. At lower levels, its main consequence is that the Paraguayan 
bureaucracy is plagued by patronage.  
In a recent paper, Ugo Panizza estimates public sector wage premiums for a cross-section 
of countries. While the average Latin American public sector employee earns roughly 4 percent 
more than workers with similar characteristics employed by the private sector, the wage 
premium for Paraguayan is around 17 percent. An implication of Panizza’s paper is that this 
indicator can be used as a measure of the relative (with respect to the private sector) inefficiency 
of the public sector (Panizza, 1999). The greatest challenge faced by the Paraguayan 
bureaucracy, though, has to do with corruption. As Kaufmann et al. show, there is a widespread 
consensus that corrupt and dishonest practices are a distinctive feature of the Paraguayan 
bureaucracy (Kaufmann et al., 1999).  
4.1.6 Civil Society 
The first Paraguayan NGOs date from the 1960s, though very few organizations were created 
between 1960 and1980. Most NGOs were established in the 1980s in the midst of a fairly 
repressive environment under late Stronismo. Different religious groups associated with the   26
Catholic Church and other Christian parishes, as well as young professionals concerned with the 
situation of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population, were among the top promoters of 
these new associations (Ocampos and Rodríguez, 1999). Paraguayan NGOs, although relatively 
few in number compared to those in other countries, tend to cover a wide range of activities. A 
1999 report by the Centro de Documentación y Estudios (CDE) identified 234 distinct 
associations. A high percentage of these NGOs (60 percent) are legally recognized as civic 
associations (“asociaciones civiles sin fines de lucro”) or foundations. This tendency to seek 
legal recognition stands in contrast to the situation prior to the transition. During the Stroessner 
years, most organizations had a de facto but not a de jure existence. In terms of their financing, 
although the relationship between the NGOs and the public sector has improved in recent years 
(it was non-existent or even conflictive in the 1980s), government subsidies are very rare, and  
most are supported by European and U.S. agencies (Ocampos and Rodríguez, 1999). 
The only two organizations in Paraguay  that can act as “last-ditch” veto players in the 
PMP are the public employees union and the peasant movement. The greater freedom of 
association permitted since 1989 allowed for the progressive strengthening of autonomous 
peasant organizations. In 1992, there were already four national peasant federations totalling 
more than 15,000 individual members. In 1993, the peasant movement launched a campaign 
demanding that the government condone cumulative interest on agricultural credits. This 
campaign brought together 22 national and local peasant organizations into the Coordinación 
Interdepartamental de Organizaciones Campesinas (CIOC). Congress passed a bill addressing 
the CIOC’s demands, but the bill was vetoed by the Executive (Analisis del Mes, December 
1993). 
Following this episode, peasant protests escalated in 1994. The protests included a march 
of 20,000 peasants in Asunción, roadblocks and demonstrations all over the country. Unionized 
workers organized a successful national strike in support of the peasants’ demands. As a result of 
these mobilizations, an expanded Mesa Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas 
(MCNOC) was created. The MCNOC has led regular peasant protests and negotiations since 
1995. In 1999, the peasants unexpectedly played a key role in the opposition to President Cubas 
Grau, allowing for González Macchi’s rise to power. Though the MCNOC emerged as a visible 
political actor at that point, its potential to act as a last-ditch veto player became manifest only   27
three years later, when peasant mobilizations blocked González Macchi’s privatization program. 
This episode is further discussed in the conclusions to the paper. 
4.2  Emerging Rules of the Policymaking Process 
As a result of the historical background described above and the institutional structure created by 
the 1992 Constitution, several new rules are emerging in the Paraguayan policymaking process. 
Because these rules are still in flux, it is hard to establish them with precision. This section 
presents an interpretation of the emerging policymaking process and then confronts the 
hypotheses with evidence based on the legislative process during the 1992-2003 period.  
Given the tradition of strong presidentialism, it is likely that the president will remain the 
initiator of all “relevant” policies. However, the president’s ability to impose the policy agenda 
has been crippled by three factors. First, the 1992 charter deprived the Executive of its immense 
constitutional powers (such as the power to dissolve Congress). Second, the re-election ban on 
the Executive transforms every president into a “lame-duck.” Therefore, the president’s ability to 
enforce policy change in key areas is likely to decline as the end of the term approaches. Third, 
the increasing fragmentation of the ANR since 1993 has eroded its ability to play the role of a 
“legislative dictator.” Therefore, the capacity of successive presidents to enforce policy change 
in Congress has declined monotonically following the Rodríguez Administration. 
At the same time, a tradition of clientelism has encouraged factional party leaders to 
build their own private clienteles in order to compete for the control of their parties. The legally 
mandated primaries have compounded the problem, triggering a competitive drive for enrolling 
new party members under the banner of each faction. Voters often enroll to participate in the 
primaries because of selective incentives provided by party bosses, but they are far from being 
committed party members. Legislators confronted with legally mandated primaries and with 
more competitive general elections are inclined to initiate particularistic bills for credit-claiming 
purposes and major bills for position-taking purposes. Given the declining re-election rates and 
the tradition of a weak legislature, it is unlikely those legislators  will be interested in grand 
policymaking.   
The decline in presidential powers, the multiplication of opposition parties and the 
emergence of autonomous factions within the ruling party points to Congress’ increasing 
propensity to operate as a veto player. In fact, the number of controversial bills has grown over 
time. Bill-related controversy (reflecting the greater role of factional veto players) tends to arise   28
over comprehensive (nation-wide, region-wide, or sector-wide) policies with regulatory or 
redistributive intent. In contrast, particularistic policies with low visibility and low marginal cost 
are less likely to generate friction within the legislature or in Executive-legislative relations. 
In this context, presidents eager to pass broad legislative agendas are forced to build 
legislative coalitions using selective incentives. Four resources stand out for this purpose: (a) 
presidents can use patronage positions (particularly in administrative areas of wide regional 
coverage such as education or public health) to benefit the constituents of loyal legislators; (b) 
they can accelerate or delay the disbursement of funds for legislators’ particularistic projects; (c) 
they can grant limited voice and visibility to small middle-class parties, always eager to convince 
their urban constituents that they have leverage in the PMP; and (d) in extreme circumstances 
they can blackmail their fellow ANR leaders arguing that in the absence of cooperation, policy 
failures will end the era of Colorado rule in the near future. 
Although there is little empirical evidence available on the use of these coalition 
instruments, recent historical events suggest that they may have some intrinsic limitations. 
Patronage and pork may be effective in attracting peripheral factions in the ruling party and in 
the PLRA, both of which are groups with limited resources that need to consolidate their 
electorates in order to survive in the primaries or eventually challenge the mainstream leaders in 
the party. At the same time, those resources may be less effective in dealing with stronger 
factions both within the ANR (like the Oviedistas) or the PLRA. To the extent that the leaders of 
these factions perform for a national audience and are eyeing the major prize (the presidency) in 
the coming election, they may be more reluctant to enter into agreements or they may demand 
excessive retribution for their support. Similarly, the argument about the need to preserve 
Colorado dominance in future elections can easily be turned on its head. When unions and 
peasant mobilizations oppose a policy initiative, Colorado leaders will invoke this argument in 
order to block policy change. 
These conditions suggest that the Paraguayan system will provide relative flexibility for 
the provision of particularistic (privately regarded) policies, but relative rigidity for the provision 
of comprehensive regulatory or redistributive policies. Particularistic policies refer to policies 
that are limited in scope (focusing on individuals or towns) and are distributive in nature 
(transferring public funds to those beneficiaries). In contrast, policies aimed at regulating broad 
economic sectors or nation-wide activities and those intended to redistribute income and   29
opportunities across social groups are expected to be more controversial and thus more likely to 
be stalled. 
In order to map the emerging Paraguayan policymaking process and to test these 
expectations, we built a database of all the legislative bills (proyectos de ley) that received final 
treatment in Congress between 1993 and 2003. Final treatment means that: a) the bill was 
approved and signed by the president; b) the bill was rejected by Congress or vetoed by the 
Executive; or c) the bill was treated for the last time at some point between 1993 and 2003 but 
the legislators made no final decision (i.e., the bill was withdrawn, archived or is pending). The 
database covers 4,576 bills, virtually every bill introduced in Congress between April 1992 and 
December 2003.  
4.2.1 Policy Initiation 
Who initiates the policymaking process under the new system? Table 1 compares the rate of bill 
initiation by branch and by administration. On average, the Executive Branch has initiated about 
one-third of the bills during the democratic era. There is no clear indication of a secular trend in 
terms of the growing or declining role of the president as policy initiator. The somewhat lower 
scores for the Rodríguez and Duarte administrations are presumably artifacts of the truncated 
sample (we only examine the last months of the Rodríguez Administration, when the president 
was already a lame duck, and just a few months of the Duarte Administration).  
We expected the type and relevance of the policies initiated by the Executive to differ 
from those initiated by Congress. In order to test this idea, we classified the content of the bills 
according to three standard criteria in the literature. The first is the intent of the policy 
(distribution of benefits to constituencies, social redistribution of resources or regulation of 
social and economic activities) according to the typology outlined by Theodore Lowi (1964). 
The second criterion is the scope of the bill (national, local, sectoral, individual) as described by 
Taylor-Robinson and Diaz (1999). The final criterion identifies the key policy areas for structural 
reform according to Lora and Panizza (2002; 2003). 
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Table 1.  
Initiation of Congressional Bills, by Administration (1992-2003)  
 
Administration  Bills Initiated by  N (%)
 Executive Deputies Senators Others 
Rodríguez 78 303 30 8  419
% (18.6) (72.3) (7.2) (1.9)  (100.0)
Wasmosy 656 782 595 55  2088
% (31.4) (37.5) (28.5) (2.6)  (100.0)
Cubas Grau  41 80 40   161
% (25.5) (49.7) (24.8)   (100.0)
González Macchi  568 787 399 24  1778
% (31.9) (44.3) (22.4) (1.3)  (100.0)
Duarte Frutos  5 53 17 1  76
% (6.6) (69.7) (22.4) (1.3)  (100.0)
Total 1348 2005 1081 88  4522
% (29.8) (44.3) (23.9) (1.9)  (100.0)
Note: The Rodríguez Administration is only examined between April 1992-August 1993; the Duarte 
Administration is only examined between August-December of 2003. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the distribution of bills by initiator, according to Lowi’s typology. 
Distributive policies transfer public funds to specific beneficiaries (public or private). 
Redistributive bills promote transfers of income and opportunities across social groups (e.g., 
minimum wage policies for the private sector). Regulatory policies norm social activity, whether 
referring to commercial transactions or criminal behavior. Contrary to our initial expectations, 
the Executive does not dominate the initiation of redistributive and regulatory policies, and is not 
less active than the legislators in the promotion of distributive policy. The president clearly 
dominates the initiation of policies in the “others” category (a residual category that includes all 
foreign policy issues). 
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Table 2.  
Bill Initiation, by Policy Goal (1992-2003)  
 
Goal  Bills initiated by  Total
 Executive Deputies Senators Others   
Distributive 553 1049 639 43  2284
 (24.2) (45.9) (28.0) (1.9)  (100.0)
Redistributive 30 178 45 5  258
 (11.6) (69.0) (17.4) (1.9)  (100.0)
Regulatory 229 674 308 28  1239
 (18.5) (54.4) (24.9) (2.3)  (100.0)
Others 536 105 87 12  740
 (72.4) (14.2) (11.8) (1.6)  (100.0)
Total 1348 2006 1079 88  4521
 (29.8) (44.4) (23.9) (1.9)  (100.0)
 
There is, however, a clear division of labor in terms of the scope of the policies initiated 
by different branches, as shown in Table 3. The Executive dominates the formulation of nation-
wide policies and policies related to the public sector (constitutionally, the Executive has gate-
keeping power over the initiation of the budget). In contrast, Congress dominates the production 
of individual-level and local bills, and more surprisingly, the production of bills targeted to the 
private sector.  
Interestingly enough, the lower house dominates the production of bills related to local 
and regional issues—suggesting that the electoral system gives deputies a clear incentive to 
represent the interests of their districts. However, in spite of being elected in a nationwide 
district, senators have displayed a significant interest in individual-level bills, while deputies also 
showed some interest in sectoral bills.  
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Table 3.  
Bill Initiation, by Policy Scope (1992-2003)  
 
Scope of the Bill  Bills initiated by  Total
 Executive Deputies Senators Others   
Individual 19 597 453 2  1071
 (1.8) (55.7) (42.3) (0.2)  (100.0)
Local/municipal 113 724 214 32  1083
 (10.4) (66.9) (19.8) (3.0)  (100.0)
Public Sector  525 167 184 34  910
 (57.7) (18.4) (20.2) (3.7)  (100.0)
Private Sector  26 55 57 1  139
 (18.7) (39.6) (41.0) (0.7)  (100.0)
Regional 5 23 1   29
 (17.2) (79.3) (3.4)   (100.0)
National 660 440 170 19  1289
 (51.2) (34.1) (13.2) (1.5)  (100.0)
Total 1348 2006 1079 88  4521
 (29.8) (44.4) (23.9) (1.9)  (100.0)
  
Tables 2 and 3 thus suggest that members of Congress have a greater propensity to 
initiate particularistic bills. Particularistic is defined as any policy characterized by i) a 
distributive purpose and ii) a limited scope (individual or municipal range). Particularistic policy 
is normally related to the distribution of pork and has a distinctively low level of public-
regardedness (Cox and McCubbins, 2001). Under this definition, we find that only 7 percent of 
all the bills initiated by the Executive during the period under study can be classified as 
particularistic, as opposed to 50 percent of all the bills initiated by the Chamber of Deputies, and 
55 percent of all the bills initiated by the Senate.   
We could not find any evidence of Executive dominance in the key policy arenas for 
structural reforms. During the period under study, the Executive Branch initiated six of the 13 
(42 percent) bills that explicitly focused on trade and tariffs, 30 of the 70 (43 percent) bills 
centered on the financial system, 14 of the 66 (21 percent) bills related to the tax system, six of 
the 31 (19 percent) bills dealing with labor policy, and only one of the 12 (8 percent) bills 
dealing with privatization policies. This does not necessarily mean that the median legislator 
initiated the most critical policies adopted in Paraguay. It is likely that many legislators initiate   33
bills mainly for “position-taking” purposes. The following sub-section shows that the bills 
initiated by the legislature are less likely to pass.  
Some evidence of electoral-cycle driving bill initiation was found. Figure 3 shows the 
average number of bills introduced in Congress and the number of months pending to the next 
general election. Although generally speaking bill initiation is not driven by the electoral cycle 
(downward spikes simply reflect the congressional summer recess), the share of particularistic 
bills (as percentage of the total bills initiated) grows by about 10 percent points during the 12 
months prior to a general election (significant at the 0.01 level), even after controlling for the 
effects of the summer recess.  
 
Figure 3  
Average Number of Monthly Bills Introduced in Congress, 
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4.2.2 Veto Players and Policy Approval  
The distinctive characteristic of the 1954-89 period was the virtual absence of any significant 
veto players. This pattern of policymaking was extended briefly into the Rodríguez 
Administration, but it was progressively dismantled in the early 1990s. The 1992 Constitution   34
strengthened the position of Congress vis-à-vis the president and, as explained in the previous 
chapter, the process of democratization allowed for an increasing number of parties and internal 
party factions. In practical terms, this means that the Paraguayan president moved from 
controlling a “granitic” Colorado Party with 67 percent of the seats in Congress in 1963 to 
bargaining with a factionalized party with 46 percent of the seats in 2003.  
To assess the impact of this process fragmentation on the PMP, we classified all bills 
according to their fate. Policy initiatives were coded as: 1) approved (signed into law); 2) 
rejected; or 3) stalled (archived, withdrawn, or pending).
13 Figure 4 shows the success rate 
(percentage approved) of executive and legislative initiatives for each administration. The 
success rate of executive-initiated bills declined from 96 percent during the last 16 months of the 
Rodríguez Administration (a significant figure considering the lame-duck position of the 
president) to 65 percent during the González Macchi administration. González Macchi’s success 
rate is comparable to the average found in a study of 11 presidential countries (63 percent) but is 
clearly lower than the rate of 72 percentenjoyed by other presidents with majority parties in 
Congress (Cheibub et al., 2004: 723). Figures for the Duarte Administration could not be 
interpreted given the truncated sample (80 percent of the bills initiated by the Executive and 93 
percent of the bills initiated by Congress were still pending resolution by the end of 2003). 
It is clear from Figure 4 that the model of executive-dominated policymaking has been 
increasingly challenged by the process of political fragmentation. But it is also true that 
fragmentation has hurt the ability of legislators to pass their preferred policies. The rate of 
Congress-initiated bills that were approved has declined from 73 percent during the last months 
of the Rodríguez Administration to about 38 percent presently.    
 
                                                 
13 Some bills are archived when their content is incorporated into a larger initiative. So in a few cases, archived bills 
may have not been really stalled. Unfortunately, there is no practical way of identifying those bills.   35
Figure 4.  









































Initiated by Congress Initiated by Executive
 
Note: The Rodríguez Administration is only examined for bills initiated between April 1992 and August 1993. 
 
Table 4 presents information on the success rate of bill initiatives by policy area. The data 
suggest that particularistic policies (distributive in nature and limited in scope) are the least 
controversial initiatives and the most likely to pass. Only  bills dealing with the public sector 
(budget and administrative issues) have similar rates of approval.   
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Table 4.  
Success Rate of Legislative Bills, by Policy Area (1992-2003)  
 
Policy Type  Outcome (%)  N 
 Approved  Rejected  Stalled   
Intent   
Distributive 62.0 13.8 24.2 2300 
Redistributive 36.1 35.0 28.9 263 
Regulatory 38.8 27.5 33.7 1260 
Other 69.5 10.4 20.1 750 
Scope    
Individual 59.0 7.3 33.7 1074 
Municipal 52.2 23.5 24.3 1093 
Public Sector  57.2 19.3 23.5 939 
Private Sector  41.5 29.6 28.9 142 
Regional 24.1 51.7 24.1 29 
National 55.9 20.1 24.0 1296 
Total 55.3 18.2 26.4 4573 
 
Based on this information, Table 5 presents a logistic regression that models the 
simultaneous effects of institutional factors and policy types on the probability of policy change 
(as measured by policy approval and presidential vetoes). The dependent variable in Model 5.1 
indicates whether a bill was ultimately approved (as opposed to rejected or stalled). The baseline 
category corresponds to a generally uncontroversial category of policy: national bills which are 
not distributive, redistributive or regulatory (e.g., foreign policy issues). The results of Model 5.1 
suggest that: a) individual-level policy initiatives are more likely to pass than the bills in the 
consensual baseline category, and municipal-level and distributive bills are equally likely to 
succeed, supporting the hypothesis that particularistic policy is relatively non-controversial; b) 
policies with a regional focus, as well as redistributive and regulatory policies are more 
controversial than the rest; c) executive-initiated bills are more likely to be successful than 
congressional bills, but this advantage has eroded with successive administrations since they 
faced increasing levels of political fragmentation; d) although there is no clear evidence of an   37
electoral policy cycle, the results suggest that the capacity of the system to promote policy 
change declines as the president approaches the end of the term.
14 
 
Table 5 . 
Success and Presidential Veto of Legislative Bills, by Initiator and Policy Area 
 
Predictor 5.1    5.2   
 Approval    Presidential  Veto   
Months to next election
a  0.004 (0.003)    0.011 (0.008)   
Administration's months in office  -0.013  (0.002)  ***  0.000  (0.006)   
Executive Initiation by
b           
Rodríguez 3.683  (0.594)  ***  -1.006  (1.038)   
Wasmosy 1.649  (0.122)  ***  -2.073  (0.613)  *** 
Cubas Grau  1.004  (0.378)  ***  -5.278  (9.322)   
González Macchi  0.870  (0.112)  ***  -1.734  (0.542)  *** 
Policy Type           
Individual level  0.415  (0.131)  ***  -2.553  (0.624)  *** 
Municipal 0.143  (0.088)    -0.909  (0.359)  ** 
Public Sector  -0.048  (0.101)    -0.039  (0.257)   
Private Sector  -0.210  (0.132)    0.485  (0.292)  * 
Regional -0.927  (0.384)  **  -0.415  (1.034)   
Distributive  0.107 (0.134)    0.614 (0.538)   
Redistributive  -0.650 (0.202)  ***  1.858 (0.601)  *** 
Regulatory  -0.571 (0.116)  ***  1.038 (0.453)  ** 
Constant 0.206  (0.138)    -3.934  (0.512)  *** 
Nagelkerke R  .178      .160     
N 4446      4446     
Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients (standard errors). The Duarte Frutos Administration was excluded from the 
sample because of limited information. 
a - Including general, municipal and vice-presidential elections. 
b – Baseline category is all bills initiated by Congress 
* Sig. at .1 level; ** sig. at .05 level; *** sig. at .01 level. 
 
In order to illustrate the substantive implications of Model 5.1, two simulations are 
presented in Figure 5 and Table 6 showing the expected probability of policy change (given the 
coefficients in Model 5.1) under different initial conditions. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of 
political fragmentation and the no re-election clause on the approval of executive-initiated bills 
                                                 
14 The inclusion of two time variables, one reflecting the number of months elapsed in office and the other indicating 
the months pending to the next election (whether national or municipal contests) is intended to separate the effects 
of the electoral calendar from the “lame-duck” effect.    38
(for simplicity, all bills are assumed to be national in scope and regulatory in nature). The 
simulation shows that: a) as the party system became more fragmented, every president after 
Andrés Rodríguez has enjoyed lower levels of policy success than his predecessor; and b) in 
every case, the effectiveness of presidential initiatives declined as the president turned into a 
lame duck. There seemed to be a consistent monotonic decline in presidential leverage starting 
with the Wasmosy Administration, although this trend may have stopped after 2003.   
 
 
Figure 5.  
Expected Probability of Success for Administrations (1992-2003)  
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Table 6 depicts the expected probability of success for bills initiated by Congress in 
different policy areas. This simulation assumes that the bill was initiated by Congress, that the 
administration is in the middle of the term and that there are no intermediate elections. The 
estimation shows that the Paraguayan policymaking process is well-equipped to deliver 
particularistic policy (distributive policy with an individual or local focus). Bills in this category 
have the highest success rate, ranging between 55 and 61 percent. In contrast, the ability of the 
legislative process to produce regulatory or redistributive policy at the regional, sectoral or even 
national level seems much weaker (16-35 percent). This general pattern holds even if one   39
assumes that the Executive Branch and not the legislators initiate the proposals. A 
“contemporary” president (someone with a leverage in between Cubas Grau and González 
Macchi), initiating a bill in the thirtieth month in office would face an expected probability of 
success ranging between 81 percent (for individual, distributive bills) and 35 percent (for 
regional-redistributive bills).  
 
Table 6.  




Distributive Redistributive Regulatory 
  
Others
Individual 0.613  0.426  0.445  0.587 
Municipal 0.546  0.361  0.380  0.520 
Public Sector  0.499  0.319  0.336  0.472 
Private Sector  0.459  0.284  0.301  0.432 
Regional 0.293  0.163  0.174  0.271 
National 0.511  0.329  0.347  0.484 
 
 
To verify these findings, we selected the occurrence of presidential vetoes as an 
alternative measure of controversy in the policy areas (Model 5.2). This measure is somewhat 
orthogonal to approval (a vetoed bill may still become law if Congress overrides a package veto 
or accepts the president’s partial veto) and it is intended to measure the controversy surrounding 
a bill rather than its success. Our dataset contains 193 episodes of partial or total vetoes, of which 
information on the PMP is complete for 104 cases. Model 5.2 confirms the idea that 
particularistic policies are less controversial (and therefore less likely to be vetoed by the 
Executive), while redistributive and regulatory policies are more likely to generate friction in the 
policymaking process. 
5. The Emerging Outer Features in Historical Perspective 
What are the features of public policies in the current period? How do they compare to the outer 
features of policies in previous historical periods? The patterns described in the last section 
suggest that the new policymaking process displays both traditional and novel characteristics. On 
the one hand, Paraguayan public policies still show a conventional feature: low public 
regardedness. On the other hand, the current period contrasts with the “golden age” of Stronismo   40
and with the Rodríguez transitional regime because during these two periods executive 
concentration of power allowed for fast policy change. In the democratic context, however, the 
multiplication of factional veto players has imposed low decisiveness on the PMP.  
5.1  Stability 
The Stroessner dictatorship was able to impose intertemporal policy deals until the succession 
crisis loomed on the political horizon. In contrast, the current PMP seems to have little ability to 
enforce long-term transactions, given: a) the ban on presidential re-election, b) the discord and 
the political realignments within the ANR, and c) the focus of the opposition on removing the 
ANR from power in the medium-run. 
This conclusion, however, must be qualified on four grounds. First, the current players 
seem to agree on the overall rules for the production and distribution of particularistic policies. 
Second, the increasing number of veto players may ultimately impose a low rate of policy 
change in the years to come. These two conditions, however, may add rigidity (rather than 
stability) to existing policies. Third, it must be noted that a direct comparison between the 
stability of the Stroessner policies and the uncertainty of the current policy regime may be 
deceiving. There is an underlying selection bias problem because at the core of the Stroessner 
model was the elimination of policy controversies—and these are precisely the instances in 
which the PMP must generate either short-term policy volatility or stable intertemporal 
transactions. 
Last, but not least, it is worth emphasizing that some of the rules that regulate 
intertemporal transactions are still in flux. For instance, for the first time in several decades, the 
Colorado Party failed to achieve a parliamentary majority in 2003. At the time of this writing, the 
Chamber of Deputies was evenly split between the Colorado plurality and the opposition, still 
too fragmented to exercise a systematic veto power. A small party, the emergent party Patria 
Querida, served as a pivotal player, negotiating with the president the approval of critical bills. It 
is possible, although certainly not guaranteed, that small parties will acquire a significant role in 
shaping the PMP. In many ways, the structure of the Paraguayan policymaking process is still in 
a formational stage.   41
5.2 Adaptability 
The Stroessner model initially generated significant levels of policy adaptability, followed by 
increasing rigidity in the 1980s as the privately regarded policies ossified. In part, these levels of 
adaptability resulted from the ability of the regime to marshal resources around long-term 
strategic projects like the “March towards the East.” (This capacity to marshal resources also 
generated perverse side effects, such as inefficient patterns of public investment.) It is clear that 
for the most part, the current policymaking process lacks the same ability Low decisiveness is in 
part the result of a weakened Executive—with regard to both constitutional and partisan 
powers—but also of legislators with little incentive to engage in policymaking beyond 
particularistic projects. 
In contrast to previous periods, the current Paraguayan PMP also has a limited ability to 
modify major policies. Many areas of reform identified as crucial by key stakeholders have been 
stalled. Among those delayed reforms are the privatization of public enterprises in the 
telecommunications, safe water and railroad sectors; the reform of social security and the health 
system; a civil service reform; the reform of state-owned banks; the implementation of policies 
to promote rural land markets and the modernization of public-sector management, including the 
strengthening of the regulatory system in the financial sector. 
During the last decade, regulatory bills initiated by the Executive have faced declining 
rates of success: 87 percent were approved by Congress during the last year of the Rodríguez 
Administration, 69 percent during Wasmosy’s term, 60 percent during the short Cubas period 
and 48 percent during the González Macchi Administration. This is not to say that Paraguayan 
presidents are completely unable to foster policy change—they still control important partisan 
and patronage resources—or that that the ability to impose unilateral policy agendas would be 
always desirable; veto players perform a major function in any democratic PMP. The Executive 
still controls important patronage resources that can be used to build policy coalitions, but such 
resources may be less effective when competing factions aspire to publicly distance themselves 
from the officials in López Palace. Thus, the potential for policy adaptability may be low in the 
areas of regulatory and redistributive policy, where controversial issues are more likely to arise.   42
5.3 Public Regardedness 
As occurred during the Stroessner era, the current PMP displays a very low level of public 
regardedness. This problem has adopted two forms: corruption and particularistic policy 
(including the distribution of public jobs and pork-barrel). Corruption is the “classic” 
manifestation of the problem. In 2002, Paraguay ranked 98 out of 102 countries in the 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index—the lowest Latin American score. The 
country additionally occupied position 140 (out of 155 ranked countries) in the Kaufmann et al. 
index of graft (Kaufmann et al., 1999). 
Although less visible in the media, particularistic policymaking may be a more relevant 
dimension of this issue. Particularism is the legal manifestation of the low public regardedness 
that permeates the system. About 55 percent of all the bills initiated by Paraguayan legislators 
are distributive in nature and 64 percent are narrow in scope (individual or municipal). In 
contrast, however, only a quarter of the bills initiated by the Ecuadorian Congress are 
distributive, and barely one-fifth are targeted at the municipal or individual levels (Araujo et al., 
2004: 30-31). The data presented above indicate that particularistic policies occupy most of the 
Paraguayan legislators’ efforts; they are non-controversial and are less likely to be vetoed by the 
Executive. 
At the same time, the factionalization that characterizes Paraguayan politics has 
permeated the public bureaucracy. Public hiring practices are characterized by a high degree of 
arbitrariness and are principally based on political favors and clientelism. Ugo Panizza has 
estimated that the average public employee in Paraguay earns 17 percent more than a worker 
with similar characteristics in the private sector, while the equivalent public sector premium in 
the average Latin American country is about 4 percent (Panizza, 1999). 
Compared to the Stroessner system, the democratic PMP displays greater inclusiveness, 
lower coordination and higher decentralization of the distributive process. Therefore, the system 
seems to be quite flexible for the production and distribution of particularistic policies 
(individual pensions, public jobs, etc.). At the same time, the initiation of such bills seems to be 
driven by clearly electoral considerations, and the combination of legally mandated primary 
races and contested general elections may increase competition for pork among legislators in the 
future.    43
5.4  Public Regardedness and Policy Rigidities 
The relationship between these two outer features (low public regardedness and low adaptability) 
is complex and deserves further exploration. We hypothesize that two opposite effects may be 
taking place. On one hand, in a context of declining formal and partisan powers, particularistic 
policy may be one of the few resources left to the Executive Branch in order to negotiate with 
Congress. An expansion of pork-barrel politics may be consistent with a strategic attempt by the 
Executive to overcome its increasing weaknesses. In the current context, the president may have 
a limited ability to adopt new regulatory or redistributive schemes, but he could be even weaker 
in the absence of distributive policy. 
On the other hand, corruption exposés de-legitimize the policymaking process, ignite 
social mobilization and discourage the formation of a legislative consensus—thus increasing 
policy rigidity. As an example of this problem, consider the frustrated privatization plan of the 
González Macchi Administration (1999-2003). Confronted with mounting deficits, the 
Administration embarked upon a program to privatize the public telecommunications company 
(Antelco, later renamed Copaco), the water supply (Corposana, later renamed ESSAP) and the 
Carlos Antonio López railroad. In May 2000, the Senate passed a bill delegating powers to the 
Executive for this purpose. The Chamber of Deputies approved the bill in October and the 
government intervened in the three companies a few days later. By mid-2001, Copaco, the 
leading case in the process, was already entering the final stage of its privatization. 
However, in April 2002 the press disclosed that the Administration had paid $600,000 to 
a private notary in order to register the transfer of assets from Antelco (the public company) to 
Copaco (the renamed firm to be privatized) even though the registration should have been 
handled by the attorney general at no cost to taxpayers. The People’s Democratic Congress, an 
alliance of peasant and union leaders, mobilized against the “corrupt privatization” of Copaco. In 
June, thousands of peasants marched to Asunción. The Central Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) 
called for a general strike and the congressional opposition initiated impeachment proceedings 
against González Macchi. Worried about the 2003 presidential race, Colorado legislators 
negotiated the repeal of the privatizations with union and peasant leaders in exchange for the 
dismantling of the protest movement. In the afternoon of June 6, the Senate approved by 32-7 a 
new bill suspending the sale of Copaco, ESSAP and the railroads. To the horror of the IMF and   44
the minister of finance, the president signed the bill immediately, deactivating the protests and 
thus the impeachment charges. 
This shows that public regardedness can be a double-edged sword. Although 
particularistic policy may facilitate policymaking by giving the Executive additional instruments 
of negotiation with Congress, corruption may erode the credibility of the PMP in the long run, 
activate the mobilization of “last-ditch” veto players and ultimately make the problem of policy 
rigidity even more acute.  
5.5  Institutionalization 
Maybe the most important contrast with the Stroessner model, however, is the greater potential 
for institutionalization of the current policymaking regime. Although the struggles within the 
Colorado Party generated outbursts of political instability in 1996, 1999 and more recently in 
2000, the absence of a “succession problem” looming on the horizon creates a more propitious 
context for developing a learning process about how to build intertemporal policy agreements. 
Thus, although the Stroessner system supplied a dominant executive capable of enforcing 
intertemporal deals in the medium run, it failed to provide a policy regime with longer horizons. 
In contrast, the current system creates a weaker executive with little ability to enforce pacts, but 
it may generate expectations for more stable rules of the game in the long run.  
Table 7 summarizes for each of the four periods the key players, the policy initiation, the 
effective number of parties, the veto players, the ability to enforce intertemporal agreements, the 
policy adaptability, the level of public regardedness and the capacity to enforce rules in the long 
run.  
Table 7 underscores two main theoretical conclusions. First, the presence of multiple veto 
players may be neither necessary nor sufficient to create policy rigidities. True, the current 
period contrasts with the “golden age” of Stronismo and with the Rodríguez transitional regime 
because during these two periods the executive concentration of power allowed for fast policy 
change. But when partisan factions converge in their policy preferences (as in the case of 
particularistic policies), policy change is easily achieved. At the same time, the presence of a 
policy dictator did not prevent policy rigidity in 1982-89. Second, the historical evidence 
supports the idea that policy adaptability and public-regardedness are independent dimensions of 
the policymaking process. Even though adaptability has varied over time, low public 
regardedness has remained a constant feature.   45
Table 7. 
Comparison of the Policymaking Process in Different Historical Moments 
 
  Stroessner I  Stroessner II  Transition  Current 
 1954-1981  1982-1989  1989-1992  1993-2003 
PMP      
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